Editorials
The problem of diagnosis in psychiatric research More than ten years ago, Birtchnell' noted that 'there is no observable or measurable physical representation of mental illness so that its presence is largely a matter of the psychiatrist's opinion'. Despite recent advances in neurochemistry, genetics and other basic science disciplines related to psychiatry, this observation is still largely true today. While the ambiguity which is inherent in this state of affairs can to some extent be accommodated and tolerated within the practice of clinical psychiatry, considerable difficulties arise for psychiatric research.
Many studies conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s attested to the highly variable and unreliable nature of clinical diagnostic assessment2. In particular, the US/UK Diagnostic Project3 demonstrated gross variation in diagnostic practices between psychiatrists on the two sides of the Atlantic. In studies conducted in a variety of settings, poor diagnostic reliability between psychiatrists was found to be largely due to (a) variations in psychiatrists' diagnostic criteria and (b) differences in the way in which information was sought and obtained from patients, i.e. variations in interviewing style.
Such findings were an important impetus for the development of operational criteria and definitions for psychiatric disorders -, for example, the Feighner criteria4 and the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC)5 -and for the construction of standardized psychiatric interviews, by means of which clinical information could be obtained in a repeatable manner and assessed in the context of one or other set of operational criteria. The most widely known of these interviews is the Present State Examination (PSE)6. More recently, attention has been given to the need to operationalize diagnostic criteria intended primarily for clinical use7.
The use of operational diagnostic criteria and standardized interviews has now become a sine qua non for any serious psychiatric research, and indeed, Kendell8 has observed that 'the original motives for introducing operational definitionsto improve reliability and to make diagnostic criteria explicit, and hence stable from place to placehave largely been achieved'. As Kendell further observes, however, this optimistic conclusion should not be taken to imply that the issues are all resolved, since a major problem is posed by the existence of 'competing' sets of diagnostic criteria and definitions.
Berner et al.9 have brought together many of the existing sets of operational criteria for schizophrenia and affective disorder. In their publication, they listed and commented on 15 different sets of diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia and 9 sets of criteria for affective psychosis. Furthermore, they noted that they were 'obliged to leave out many systems because of limited space'. It might be thought that, in sharp contrast to the position 10-15 years ago when operational criteria were urgently needed, there are now too many.
Furthermore, not only is there a multiplicity of criteria, they are not identical. In 1978 Brockington et al.'I applied 10 different sets of diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia to a series of psychotic patients admitted to the Maudsley Hospital. The proportion of patients who fulfilled each of the criteria (i.e. would have been diagnosed as schizophrenic) ranged from 3% to 38%, and the average concordance between the different research definitions was only 29%. These and similar findings led Kendell8 to comment that 'it is painfully obvious that the findings of any research on schizophrenia will largely depend on which definition happens to be chosen'.
Findings such as these raise the paradoxical notion that psychiatric diagnosis, usually regarded as the criterion against which to validate screening questionnaires and tests, may itself require validation. While it is simplistic and naive to ask which of the many diagnostic definitions is to be regarded as the 'right' onesince, as Kendell8 has pointed out, unambiguous discontinuities between psychiatric syndromes have yet to be demonstratedit is nonetheless appropriate to consider which are the appropriate criteria to use for a specified purpose. For example, the diagnostic criteria appropriate for use in a clinical study of outcome may not be equally appropriate for use in an investigation of biological correlates. Furthermore, as Kendell8 noted, it seems sensible, in any one study, to use more than one diagnostic definition, and to 'examine the relationships between the variables we are studying and each of these definitions in turn'. Such an approach may well eventually provide the information necessary for subsequent rational choice between alternative diagnostic criteria.
The consideration of appropriateness, or relevance, of diagnostic criteria is of particular importance in the context of the rapidly expanding area of psychiatric epidemiological research in the community and in primary care, since the relevance of psychiatric diagnosis in these settings has been questioned. As Shepherd" observed, much psychiatric disorder in the community is characterized by 'such features as depression, anxiety, preoccupation with health, irritability and insomnia ... to include them with the neurotic disorders of Section V of the I.C.D. can serve to extend an outworn concept to breaking point'.
Not only is there clear evidence, mostly derived from factor analytic studies, that psychiatric morbidity in the community is largely undifferentiated'2"13, there is also evidence to suggest that diagnostic criteria derived from, and for, patients seen in specialist psychiatric practice, may incorporate threshold levels which are inappropriate for non-specialist settings. For The Royal Society of Medicine population sample, and found that although there were 'a wide variety of clinically meaningful scales reliable for use with patients ... most of these proved unreliable in the general population sample' (my italics). One of the explanations advanced for this finding was a 'too exclusive focus on extremes of symptomatology that are rare in general populations'. In a later paper, Dohrenwend and his colleagues'4 drew attention to the same problem occurring with the Present State Examination. They cited the findings of Wing et al.'5, who studied the difference between depression in the community and in patient samples. Of psychiatric inpatients or outpatients categorized as depressed according to the PSE, more than 80% met the Feighner criteria4 for definite or probable depression. In contrast, only 13% of the community respondents categorized as depressed by the PSE satisfied the Feighner criteria. Dohrenwend et al.'4 noted that the findings demonstrated that the PSE and its associated index of definition 'clearly are not measuring the same thing in general population samples as in samples of psychiatric patients'.
It is clear, therefore, that criteria for psychiatric case definition and diagnosis need to be developed, refined and selected in the context of a specific research or clinical objective"6. Thus, searching for the perfect diagnostic criteriareliable, valid ard relevant in all situationsis unlikely to be productive. P 
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Effects of chronic illness on the child's intellectual development
The pattern of childhood disease has changed dramatically over the last few decades. Increasingly sophisticated medical treatment has enabled children with once fatal diseases, such as leukaemia or cystic fibrosis, to experience relatively long-term survival. In other instances, children with extremely severe forms of handicap, including those with congenital abnormalities, can also be treated1'2. Such chronic conditions affect some 10-12% of the school-age population3'5. In all cases there is no available cure, but children can be maintained in a relatively stable condition. All such children lead an uneasy existence. On the one hand, they are required to undergo routine and often painful treatments and attend hospital regularly. On the other hand, they are also expected to attend school and lead as normal a life as any other child. It is natural to ask how successfully such children are able to achieve this. Much research points to the fact that chronically sick children are at some risk in terms of their intellectual, social and personal development as a consequence of the disease6. A child's success in school and IQ score are often taken as indicators of the degree to which a disease has compromised development generally. Concentration on these measures rather than on those of social skill or personality can be attributed to the wider availability of acceptable tests of IQ and school achievement, rather than any theoretical reason why IQ should be affected. Research has nevertheless been quite consistent in indicating that chronically sick children tend to have normal or slightly below-normal IQ scores, and in addition substantially reduced scores on tests of achievement, especially reading. Studies by Ack et al. 7 and Gath et al.8 working with diabetics, Olch9 working with haemophiliacs, and Burton'0 working with cystics have all reached these conclusions. Results with children with asthma are more contradictory. Some studies point to children with asthma having slightly higher than average IQ scores" -13, and these results would seem to support the stereotype of the 'studious' asthmatic child. A more recent survey by Anderson and colleagues'4 showed that school absence had no measurable effect on the child's reading age, but did adversely affect social and emotional behaviour.
In each of the above instances it is difficult to point to a specific reason for the lowered scores, since the diseases are not generally thought to affect 0141-0768/86/ 010002-03/$02.00/0 01986 The Royal Society of Medicine
